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Civil Procedure. May v. Penn T.V. & Furniture Co., 686 A.2d 95
(R.I. 1996). Joint answer by counsel for employer, in action against
employer and employee, did not waive employee's defect of service
of process defense, since employee was not client of counsel, and
lacked actual knowledge of the action.
Under Rule 4 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure,'
service of a summons and complaint "shall be served together" and
made:
[u]pon an individual from whom a waiver has not been ob-
tained... by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint
to the individual personally or by leaving copies thereof at the
individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode.., or by
delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to an agent
authorized... to receive service .... 2
The rule is to be "followed and construed strictly since jurisdiction
of the court over the person of a defendant is dependent upon
proper service having been made."3 Failure to follow the specific
procedure set forth in Rule 4 ultimately may result in the dismis-
sal of a complaint for lack of service of process.
FACTs AN] TRAVEL
In November of 1989, Thomas May was involved in an auto-
mobile accident with an individual whom he later learned was one
Joseph Merolla III, an employee of the Penn T.V. & Furniture
Company.4 In February 1991, May filed suit against Penn T.V. for
personal injuries suffered in the accident.1 May later amended his
complaint to include Merolla as an additional defendant.6 Before
May was able to serve process on Merolla, counsel for Penn T.V.
filed and served a joint answer on behalf of Penn T.V. and Me-
rolla. 7 Nowhere in this responsive pleading did Penn T.V.'s coun-
sel raise the affirmative defense of insufficient service of process on
1. R.I. Super. Ct. K. Civ. P. 4.
2. I-
3. Shannon v. Norman Block, Inc., 256 A.2d 214, 218 (LI. 1969) (citing
Geyer v. Callan Constr. Co., 101 A.2d 876, 877 (R.1. 1954); Home Say. Bank v.
Rolando, 189 A. 27, 29 (R.I. 1937)).
4. May v. Penn T.V. & Furniture Co., 686 A.2d 95, 96 (RI. 1996).
5. Id,
6. I&
7. Id. at 96-97.
SURVEY SECTION
Merolla.s May treated the joint answer as a general appearance by
both defendants, and the omission of the insufficient service de-
fense as a waiver of that affirmative defense.9 Consequently, May
never attempted to serve Merolla as required by Rule 4.10
Unbeknownst to May or his counsel, sometime after the acci-
dent Merolla left Penn T.V.'s employ and departed to an unknown
location." At no time was Merolla made aware of the pending law-
suit, nor did he ever authorize Penn T.V.'s attorney to accept ser-
vice, represent him, or file an answer on his behalf.' 2 It was not
until May filed a motion for default judgment against Merolla two
years later that Penn's attorney, unable to locate his purported cli-
ent, moved to amend the joint answer to include the earlier omit-
ted affirmative defense of insufficient service of process.' 3
Additionally, the attorney moved to dismiss the complaint against
Merolla for lack of service of process.' 4 Both motions were
granted.' 5
BACKGROUND
Other jurisdictions confronting the issue raised in May have
ruled in a fashion similar to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court of Vermont has held that, "[a]lthough a general ap-
pearance by an attorney cures all defects of service of process...
when the purported clients have never been given any notice of the
pendency of the suit, as is the case here, no unauthorized appear-
ance binds them."' 6 Similarly, in a case with a slight variation on
the May fact pattern, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
rejected a suit where service was made to an attorney who served
as counsel in prior litigation, but who was not authorized to bind
8. Id-
9. Id. at 97.
10. Id Specifically, May relied on Mack Construction Co. v. Quonset Real Es-
tate Corp., 122 A.2d 163 (R.I. 1956). "Inasmuch as it is well settled that by a gen-
eral appearance a defendant submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court, any
failure to serve him with process becomes immaterial." IM.; see also 1 Kent, R.I.
Civ. Prac. § 12.2, at 109 (1969) ("[A] defendant who simply answers to the merits of
a claim thereby consents to the jurisdiction of the court.").
11. May, 686 A.2d at 97.
12. Id
13. Id
14. Id
15. I&
16. Batcheder v. Mantak, 392 A.2d 945, 948-49 (Vt. 1978).
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his principal by the acceptance of process in the pending suit.17 As
a result, it is important to secure proper authority or consent
before representing a client, and to follow the established proce-
dure for service of process as articulated in Rule 4 of the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure.
ANALYsis AND HOLDING
In a colorful opinion replete with literary allusions, the court
in May, speaking through Justice Flanders, stressed the fact that
it was reviewing only the grant of the motion for dismissal. 18 Re-
view of the motion to amend the joint answer was not properly
before the court. 19 The court noted, however, that the disposition
of the case would be the same whether either motion was at
issue.20
The court began by reiterating that although Rule 4 provided
no specific time limit for completing service of process, it "must be
effectuated within a reasonable time following the filing of the com-
plaint, unless a plaintiff can demonstrate that a longer delay was
excusable." 2 ' Since May did not effectuate service of process on
Merolla, the court stated that it would have been error for the trial
court not to dismiss the action.22 Even if the case had proceeded to
judgment against Merolla, the result would not have been binding
17. McLaughlin v. Fidelity Sec. Life Ins., 667 A.2d 105, 108 (D.C. 1995); see
also Sington v. Allen, 431 So. 2d 547 (Ala. 1983) (judgment reversed where attor-
ney appeared on behalf of clients who later claimed they never authorized the at-
torney to receive service, to represent them in a lawsuit or to waive service of
process); Schneider v. Buckman, 412 N.W.2d 787 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd on
other grounds, 433 N.W.2d 98 (1988) (implying a duty on the plaintiff's attorney to
inquire as to representation when a possible conflict of interest appears to exist
between two defendants purportedly represented by the same attorney); Grimaley
v. Nelson, 451 S.E.2d 336, 339 (N.C. 1994) (answer filed by an insurer's attorney
does not constitute a "general appearance" by the insured, thus preserving affirma-
tive defenses).
18. May, 686 A.2d at 97.
19. Review of the motion to amend the joint answer was not requested in the
petition for certiorari, nor was a transcript of the proceedings below on that issue
provided to the supreme court. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting Catone v. Multimedia Concepts, Inc., 482 A-2d 1081, 1083
(RI. 1984)). Rule 4 was amended during the course of the case. Under the current
rule, the court will dismiss an action without prejudice after 120 days if the plain-
tiff cannot show good cause why service of process was not made within that pe-
riod. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 4(1).
22. May, 686 A.2d at 98.
SURVEY SECTION
because, "the court would have been duty bound to correct the situ-
ation no matter when or how it learned of the truth."2 3
The court acknowledged that no employment contract, nor any
other relationship, existed between Merolla and Penn T.V.'s attor-
ney.24 Since the attorney is essentially "an agent employed by a
party to a case to manage the same for him," the attorney's acts in
representing his client "must be regarded as the acts of his cli-
ent."25 Merolla had done nothing, however, "to clothe Penn's law-
yer with any apparent authority to represent him, to appear on his
behalf, or to waive service of process."26 Therefore, the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court held that "fundamental due-process consider-
ations-and bedrock principles of agency law-prevent
punishing an unserved party defendant for the misdeeds of a law-
yer he never engaged in a lawsuit about which he was never
notified."27
CONCLUSION
The result in May serves as a caution flag to those lawyers
relying on mere pleadings prepared by opposing counsel as proof
that an unserved defendant is duly represented in the lawsuit.
Plaintiffs will be unable to obtain or enforce any judgment against
such a defendant. The court did not necessarily fault May or his
counsel for relying on the pleading, especially in light of the failure
to raise the lack of service of process defense. The warning in May,
however, is clear; a plaintiff should properly serve all parties de-
fendant before falling for such "alluring bait as was presented
here."28
Mark B. Watson
23. Id at 99 (quoting Lamarche v. Lamarche, 348 A.2d 22, 23 (RLI. 1975)); see
RI. Gen. Laws § 9-21-2(a)(4) (1985) (granting courts the power to relieve a party or
his legal representative from a void final judgment, order, decree or proceeding);
RI. Super. CL R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4).
24. May, 686 A.2d at 99.
25. Id- (quoting Cohen v. Goldman, 132 A.2d 414, 416 (ILI. 1957)).
26. Id-
27. Id (citations omitted).
28. Id.
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